Network level defenses for software-defined internet of things. by Ishfaq, Bilal
Network Level Defenses for
Software-Defined Internet of
Things
A thesis submitted for the Degree of Master of
Science in Computer Science
by
Bilal Ishfaq
Department of Computer Science and





1.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 Research Questions and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Motivation and Key Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Related Work 14
2.1 SDN for IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Deception and MTD for IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Our Motivations and Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Reactive Defense Mechanism 22
3.1 SD-IoT Network and Scenario Description . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 Proposed approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.4 Attacker Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.5 Defense Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.6 Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.7 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.7.1 Simulation Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.7.2 Simulation Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1
3.7.3 Simulation Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.8 Results Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.9 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4 Proactive Defense Mechanism 41
4.1 Scenario Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.1 Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.2 Attack Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.3 Defense Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3 Security Failure Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.4 Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4.1 Calculation of Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.5 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.5.1 Simulation Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.5.2 Network Scenarios to Calculate Metrics . . . . . . . . . 58
4.5.3 Six schemes to compare the metric results based on
when-to-shuffle and how-to-shuffle strategies . . . . . . 59
4.5.4 Comparative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.6 Results Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5 Conclusion 66
5.1 Limitations and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2
Acknowledgement
I am thankful to many people in making my Masters thesis possible. I
would like to offer special thanks to my supervisors: Dr. Fabian Gilson,
Dr. Dong Seong Kim and Dr. Mengmeng Ge for their invaluable guidance,
supervision, and encouragement to me throughout this research. They not
only provided me helpful suggestions, but also accepted responsibility to
oversee this research, and guided me to the successful completion of this
thesis. This thesis would not have been produced without their invaluable
advice, excellent knowledge, unceasing support and enormous patience.
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude and appreciation to my
parents for their endless love and support during my life. Without their moral
support, this thesis would never have been completed. Last but not least,
to all my sisters, their love and encouragements made this thesis possible.
I would like to express my deep appreciation to my dear lab friends, who
provided so much support and encouragement throughout this research and
studies process. I wish them all the best in their future undertaking.
3
List of Abbreviations
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
AP Attack Path
APV Attack Path Variation
APE Attack Path Exposure
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DC Defense Cost
DDS Data Distribution Service
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DoS Denial of Service
FS Fix Shuffling
HARM Hierarchical Attack Representation Model
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IoT Internet of Things
LPWPANs Low Powered Wireless Personal Area Networks
MTTC Mean Time To Compromise
MTD Moving Target Defense
4
MTTSF Mean Time To Security Failure
NTS Network Topology Shuffling
NVD National Vulnerability Database
OS Operating System
RS Random Shuffling
SDN Software Defined Networking
SFC Security Failure Condition
VLANs Virtual Local Area Networks
WSNs Wireless Sensors Networks
5
Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) has become a point of attraction to the indus-
try and academia recently. The IoT is becoming popular because of the
lesser prices and easy availability of smart devices. The IoT network consists
of heterogeneous devices with limited computational and power resources,
and not equipped dynamically to respond to abnormalities. Besides, some
of the IoT nodes in an IoT network are attached with vulnerabilities. To
ensure the security for such types of IoT networks, we propose a reactive de-
fense mechanism and integrated proactive defense mechanism of an software-
defined IoT (SD-IoT) network. The reactive defense mechanism provides the
maximum number of hard to exploit vulnerable IoT nodes along the path
to the base station, after reconfiguration. To reconfigure the IoT network
topology, we develop and implement a reconfiguration algorithm, using the
software-defined networking (SDN) controller. The algorithm reconfigures
the topology, when the intrusion is detected in the IoT network.
In the integrated proactive defense mechanism, we use cyber deception
along with the Moving Target Defense (MTD). The cyber deception includes
the decoy system and attracts the attacker towards itself. On the interaction
of the attacker, the decoy system captures the intentions of the attacker. The
MTD makes the attack surface hard by shuffling the connections between IoT
nodes. To analyze the effectiveness of our proposed defense mechanisms, we
measure the security metrics using the Hierarchical Attack Representation
Model (HARM).
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The results of our reactive defense mechanism and integrated proactive
defense mechanism show the increase in attack efforts.
In summary, the contributions of the thesis are; 1) To develop a reac-
tive defense mechanism and reconfiguration algorithm to changes the IoT
network topology on intrusion detection and to calculate the mean-time-to-
compromise (MTTC) security metric that shows the effectiveness of our de-
fense mechanism; 2) To develop an integrated proactive defense mechanism,
implement the cyberdeception and MTD as defense strategies, develop, im-
plement and calculate the security metrics (i.e., Attack Path Variation, At-
tack Path Exposure, mean-time-to-security-failure and Defense cost) to show




It has been observed that the Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming an es-
sential part of human being lives for the last decade [1]. IoT provides a
transition of real things into virtual where all objects can be readable, ad-
dressable, and discoverable over the internet [2]. The IoT networks consist
of IoT nodes and the IoT nodes communicates with each other via different
communication protocols such as wireless standard Bluetooth [3], WiFi [4]
and ZigBee [5]. These IoT devices are deployed at different locations, e.g.,
bus stops, street lights or underground in the water, to collect required data.
The IoT devices have less computation and power storage capacity.
1.1 Problem Statement
An IoT network consists of heterogeneous IoT devices. These heterogeneous
IoT devices are attached to different exploitable vulnerabilities that make
IoT networks vulnerable to attackers. These vulnerabilities can be classified
as known and unknown vulnerabilities shown in Figure 1. The known vul-
nerabilities attached to the IoT nodes could be patchable or non-patchable
(forever day) vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to
launch attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks [6], node
capture and control [7], physical damage [8] and reconnaissance [9]–[11] at-
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tacks. It is one of the objectives to mitigate the impact of such attacks on
IoT devices and to secure IoT networks. The ideal solution to mitigate the
Figure 1: Scenario Description
attack impact is to remove all the patchable, non-patchable and zero-day
vulnerabilities associated with the IoT devices. However, it is not achievable
because of the time and cost constraints. Besides, the zero-day vulnerabil-
ities (not known to the vendor and identified by the attacker) are always
exploitable by attackers. There is a need for alternative defense mechanisms
to respond to attacks and to secure the IoT networks in real-time.
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1.2 Research Questions and Objectives
Q1: What defense mechanisms can we use proactively to harden an attack
surface of an IoT network?
Q2: What defense mechanism can we use reactively to make the attack
surface hard and to respond to the intrusions detected, in an IoT network?
The objective of our work is to protect the SD-IoT network from attackers
by applying integrated proactive defense mechanism (to address Q1) and
reactive defense mechanisms (to address Q2). The two objectives to address
the research questions are as follows.
1) To make the attack surface hard using an integrated proactive defense
mechanism.
2) To reconfigure the SD-IoT network topology using a reactive defense mech-
anism.
1.3 Methodology
We follow the same methodology for each of our proposed defense solution.
Our methodology consists of the following scenarios.
System Model: In our system model, we consider the SD-IoT network
and analyze it based on real-world network scenarios such as smart hospitals,
smart offices, and smart homes, etc. We explain the type of IoT devices used
in the network along with the network scenario. We assume the size of the
network and area of deployment (i.e., open environment or in a building
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based on hypotheses). Finally, we explain how communication takes place
between the IoT nodes in the IoT network.
Attacker Model: In the attacker model, we assume the attacker’s privi-
leges to compromise the node and intentions to compromise the IoT network.
The assumptions also include how attacker select the target and how he/she
exploit the different paths to reach the target. The attacker model also ex-
plains the knowledge of the attacker, he/she already have about the IoT
network such as the exploitable vulnerabilities information and the entry
point to the IoT network. The attacker uses this knowledge to find the entry
point and to compromise the SD-IoT network.
Defense Model: Our defense model includes the defense solutions to
counter the attacks and to protect the IoT network. The defense solutions
are the different techniques or mechanisms which are used to protect the
SD-IoT network. The defense solutions are implemented via SDN controller
to the IoT network. The SDN controller changes the network topology at
defined security failure conditions. We implement the defense solutions at
the network level or at the node level and evaluate it based on the defined
system model and attacker model as explained above.
Evaluation: We conduct simulations for evaluation. The simulation
validates our proposed defense techniques via security metrics. We use the
simulations scenario based on our proposed system model and the attacker
model.
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1.4 Motivation and Key Contribution
The motivation behind our work is to provide security solutions for IoT net-
works consist of easy to exploit vulnerability of an IoT node and hard to
exploit vulnerability of an IoT node. The attacker exploits the vulnerability
to compromise the IoT node and the IoT network. To protect the IoT net-
work from the attacker, we contributed to the IoT security-related research
field and propose two defense mechanisms, namely a proactive defense mech-
anism and a reactive defense mechanism. The proactive defense mechanism
includes the cyberdeception and MTD techniques to make the attack sur-
face hard for the attacker. The reactive defense mechanism includes the IoT
network topology reconfiguration on intrusion detection to make the attack
surface hard for the attacker.
For the security analysis of the IoT network, we use the Hierarchical
Attack Representation Model (HARM) [12] and measure the security metrics.
The HARM takes the topology information as an input and constructs two
layers. The Upper layer includes the attack graphs for the attack paths
from the entry point up to the base station. The lower layer includes the
vulnerability information of the nodes.
To address the research question Q1, our contribution is as follows:
• Propose a proactive defense mechanism that uses a concept of deception
and MTD techniques.
• Design different network scenarios and use shuffling schemes based on
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deception and MTD techniques.
• Use the metrics to measure the effectiveness of the proposed proactive
defense mechanism.
To address the research question Q2, our contribution is as follows:
• Propose a reactive defense mechanism for SD-IoT networks that con-
sists of easy to exploit vulnerability and hard to exploit vulnerability
of IoT nodes.
• Develop the algorithm to reconfigure the IoT network topology that
gives the maximum number of hard to exploit vulnerability of IoT
nodes along the path to the target.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature
and summarizes techniques for IoT network security. Chapter 3 presents
the reactive defense mechanism for SD-IoT networks. Chapter 4 explains
the integrated proactive defense mechanism for SD-IoT networks. Finally,




SDN makes network management easy compared to traditional IP networks
[13]. SDN gives centralized control by separating the control plane from the
data plane and manages all the devices with a single controller [14]. In the
following, we discuss the solutions of SDN for the IoT networks to explore
the feasibility of IoT integration with SDN and present the work addressing
the SD-IoT security issues.
2.1 SDN for IoT
Liu et al. [15] proposed an SDN based IoT architecture for smart urban sens-
ing. They carried a quantitative analysis and used a case study to present
the benefits of SD-IoT architecture. The proposed architecture incorporates
three layers. The physical layer consists of servers, forwarding devices, sensor
platforms, and gateways. It collects the data from the smart environment
and sends it to the server. The control layer is made up of a cloud con-
troller, network controller, and the sensor controller to manage the devices
of the physical layer through southbound APIs. This research work proposes
the solution for integrating SDN with an IoT architecture and confirms the
feasibility of SD-IoT architecture.
Hakiri et al. [16] proposed an IoT architecture that integrates a data
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distribution service (DDS) and SDN. The DDS is a message-oriented pub-
lish/subscribe and acts as middleware. The architecture includes the IoT
gateways which are SDN-enabled and, are connected to the smart devices.
The IoT gateways are also connected to the SDN forwarding devices, that
forward the packets according to defined flow rules, via southbound inter-
faces. This research addresses the mobility and the scalability issues in the
SDN-enabled IoT gateways framework that ensures the integration of SDN
with IoT. Sandor et al. [17] developed an SDN based algorithm for hybrid
IoT network architecture. The hybrid architecture includes non-SDN topol-
ogy segments (i.e., non SDN switches) and SDN switches with redundant
communication points. The redundant communication points were induced
to enhance the resilience of the network and to maintain the performance
continuous in the presence of the attack. The algorithm is used to evaluate
the performance of reconfiguration by switching the path from the attacked
path to the redundant entry points, on DDoS attack detection. However, the
proposed solution is semi-SDN based. Besides, the redundant paths do not
change the attack surface as the position of the redundant communication
points is the same. It only gives the alternative way for the traffic. Our
proposed approach is fully SDN-based and switch the connections between
the IoT nodes to change the attack surface.
Grigoryan et al. [18] proposed an SDN based IoT architecture that in-
cludes IP based cooperative security for multiple IoT networks. The SDN
controller first identifies the malicious activities provided by the end sys-
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tem (e.g., end users that is the entry point of attacker) and then broadcast
these malicious activities to the network level in multiple network environ-
ments, to stop the malicious traffic. Also, the SDN controller in the proposed
architecture blocks potential attackers and evaluate the authenticity of the
architecture itself by double-checking the traces of malicious traffic. The pro-
posed work gives the IP based security solution for SD-IoT networks. Our
approach is based on MTD technique that changes the attack surface by
shuffling the connection between IoT nodes. Besides, our approach is better
as the attacker loses all the gathered information about the entry points on
reconfiguration.
Chakrabarty et al. [19] proposed a protocol for secure communication in
the IoT network using SDN. They proposed a solution for encryption of both
payload and meta-data in the network layer and link layer. The centralized
SDN controller works as a reliable third party and uses black packets [20] to
communicate with the IoT resource-constrained devices. They carried out
simulations which use different modes of the nodes (awake mode or asleep
mode) and different topologies. The results showed enhanced security pro-
vided by the proposed architecture than the existing 802.15.4 protocol.
In this section, we investigated related works proposing solutions to en-
hance the security of SD-IoT networks. We found it feasible that SDN can
manage different types of devices, i.e., SDN with wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) as sensing devices, SDN with Mobile networks as user devices, and
SDN with IoT as a smart environment. The SDN controller is programmable
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and uses this functionality to configure all the IoT devices. It makes the
administration tasks easy compared to the traditional network, and the net-
work administrator can define the flow rules and view the IoT network from
a single central SDN controller.
2.2 Deception and MTD for IoT
Deception is the defensive technique that is in addition to the traditional de-
fense mechanisms (e.g., Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Firewall or anti-
software, etc) [21]. La et al. [22] used the honeypot-enabled decoy IoT
network and proposed a game theoretic model. In the model, the attacker
interacts with the defender and deceive the defender via suspicious or seem-
ingly traffic. As a defense, the defender uses a honeypot system to capture
the attacker. Anirudh et al. [23] proposed a honeypot (decoy) model for on-
line servers in IoT network to mitigate the DoS attack. They use the decoy
server in the main server and mitigate the DoS attack in the decoy server.
The mitigation of the DoS attack at the decoy server prevents the complete
shutdown of the IoT network. However, the work [22], [23], as explained
above have not analyzed the deception impact on network level security for
SD-IoT network.
MTD is a defense technique applied to a network to continuously change
the attack surface for the attacker by network reconfiguration [24]. MTD
is categorized into three classes namely Shuffling, diversity, and redundancy
[25]. The shuffling MTD technique changes the network configuration to
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confuse the attackers. The configuration changes could be network addresses
or network topology reconfiguration. The diversity MTD techniques make
the attack surface hard by using different system components (e.g., software
with different kinds of operating systems while provide the same functional-
ity) with the same functionality. The redundancy MTD techniques change
the attack surface dynamically via replicas of the network components [26].
Ge et al. [27] evaluated the performance of the existing MTD technique
called Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) using the HARM. This
MTD technique is deployed for the IoT nodes that makes difficult for the
attacker to find the locations of IoT nodes in randomly placed areas. Hence
it increases security by widening the search space area. They used the attack
success probability, compromise rate, and attack cost as metrics to evaluate
this technique. This defense mechanism only uses MTD while our proposed
defense mechanism uses decoy system with MTD. The decoy system monitors
the attacker intentions when they interact with it. Also, we implement and
measure additional security metrics such as attack path variation (APV) and
attack path exposure (APE) to randomize the attack paths.
Sherburne et al. [28] proposed an IP shuffling based MTD technique. The
IP addresses of IoT devices change dynamically using the concept of a random
assignment approach. They used the Low Powered Wireless Personal Area
Networks (LPWPANs) as a protocol for IoT devices communication. Zeitz
et al. [29] extended the approach proposed by Sherburne et al. [28]. They
presented the design for the MTD technique that is based on IP address
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rotation while our defense mechanism is based on change in connections
between nodes.
Ge et al. [30] introduced the proactive defense mechanism for the SD-IoT
network. They developed two proactive defense mechanisms to reconfig-
ure the SD-IoT network. In these two proactive defense mechanisms, they
considered two cases: The SD-IoT network that includes patchable and non-
patchable nodes, and the SD-IoT network only includes non-patchable nodes.
They conducted the simulation and measured the security metrics to evaluate
their defense mechanism. They used the optimal method and the heuristic
method to reconfigure the SD-IoT network topology. In the Optimal method,
the algorithm introduced a maximum number of patchable nodes in the path
from the entry point to the target. However, this algorithm has limitations
of hops restriction. The algorithm cannot change (increase or decrease) the
hop count for the nodes after reconfiguration. The heuristic method elimi-
nated the limitation. However, the heuristic method did not guarantee the
maximum number of patchable nodes or the hard to exploit node in the path
to the base station. In our work, we proposed the algorithm that offers the
maximum number of hard to exploit IoT nodes along the path to the base
station.
Kouachi et al. [31] uses a MTD technique for packet flow anonymization in
IoT network. They addressed the security issues related to the identification
of communication flow and tracking of the packets. They proposed “micro
One Time Address” as a defense solution for power constraint (less power
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storage capacity) IoT devices that enhance the life of the IoT devices . This
defense solution changes the structure of the IPv4 packets and uses the single
IP address (instead of using all the information in the packet header), used
to transmit the packet, for verification. However, the solution causes recon-
figuration overhead and the change of IP header requires the reconfiguration
of all involved routers.
Nizzi et al. [32] proposed a lightweight MTD technique that shuffles IP
addresses. The MTD technique is named HMAC (AShA) which is based on
a hash function. It changes the IP address in the IoT network and permits
the IoT devices to recompute their addresses when a multicast message is
sent to the network by the switch. This MTD technique is based on IP
address shuffling to counter the attack while our MTD technique is based on
changing the connections to stop the attacker.
2.3 Our Motivations and Rationale
We explained the different defense mechanisms in the literature review, used
for SD-IoT networks to protect the network from attackers. The exceptions
to this are the security solutions given by [17], [30].
However, our proposed work includes a reactive defense mechanism that
changes the connections at the edges, from easy to exploit vulnerability of
IoT nodes to hard to exploit vulnerability of IoT nodes during topology
reconfiguration and removes the hop count limitation of as in [30].
Our proposed work also includes an integrated proactive defense mecha-
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nism that uses cyberdeception with MTD to make the attack surface hard for
the attacker. The decoy system includes the decoy nodes and captures the
intentions of the attacker when the attacker interacts with the decoy nodes.
The MTD changes the attack surface dynamically by reconfiguring the SD-
IoT network topology. On reconfiguration, the attacker loses the gathered
information about the network.
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Chapter 3
3 Reactive Defense Mechanism
The motivation behind our work is to change the attack surface that lowers
the probability of successful attacks. To achieve this goal, we provide a de-
fense mechanism for IoT networks that consist of easy to exploit and hard to
exploit vulnerabilities of IoT nodes. We aim to offer the maximum number
of IoT nodes, having hard to exploit vulnerabilities, to the attacker along
the path to the target. Therefore we propose a defense mechanism named
reactive defense mechanism. It reconfigures the IoT network topology on
intrusion detection and replaces the IoT nodes having easy-to-exploit vul-
nerabilities with the IoT nodes having hard-to-exploit vulnerabilities along
the path from the entry point of the attacker up to the target.
To reconfigure the IoT network topology, we use a reconfiguration algo-
rithm. For the security analysis of the IoT network, we use HARM [12]. It
constructs the attack paths from the entry point of the attacker up to the
target of the attacker, and we compute MTTC across each attack path. The
answer to the research question Q2 “How can we respond to the intrusions
reactively, for IoT network” is given by the following contributions.
• Propose a reactive defense mechanism for the SD-IoT network.
• Develop an algorithm to reconfigure the IoT network topology on in-
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trusion detection.
3.1 SD-IoT Network and Scenario Description
The proposed IoT network as shown in Figure 2 follows a tree topology and
consists of heterogeneous IoT nodes having easy to exploit vulnerabilities and
hard to exploit vulnerabilities. The attacker can exploit the vulnerabilities
attached with the IoT nodes and can break into the IoT network. Once the
attacker successfully exploits the first (entry point) IoT node, he/she tries
to exploit the neighbor IoT nodes of the entry point node to reach the base
station. On intrusion detection by the IDS, the SDN controller reconfigures
the network topology to block the attackers.
We consider a smart environment of the IoT network as a scenario that
consists of two types of IoT nodes as follows.
• Noise sensor IoT nodes
• Weather sensor IoT nodes
The noise sensor IoT nodes have easy to exploit vulnerabilities and weather
sensor IoT nodes have hard to exploit vulnerabilities. As shown in Figure 2,
the red (squares) IoT nodes are noise sensors and the blue (circles) IoT nodes
are weather sensor IoT nodes respectively.
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Figure 2: An Example Scenario and Configuration
3.2 Proposed approach
The IoT network as discussed in Section 3.1 consists of different IoT nodes.
To protect the IoT network from attackers, we change the attack surface by
reconfiguring the IoT network topology using a reactive defense mechanism.
After reconfiguration, we obtain a reconfigured IoT network topology which
offers the maximum number of IoT nodes having hard to exploit vulnera-
bilities from the entry point of the attacker up to the target (base station).
The topology reconfiguration takes place on intrusion detection by IDS. We
make the assumption to compute all possible sets of topologies, offering the
maximum number of IoT nodes having hard to exploit vulnerabilities along
the path to the base station. These pre-calculated sets of topologies give the
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same number of hop counts (connection link between two neighbor nodes
is one hop) in the initial topology. On intrusion detection, the algorithm
applies suitable pre-calculated topology that offers the maximum number of
IoT nodes with hard to exploit vulnerabilities.
To summarize, the reactive defense mechanism limits the topology changes
by pre-calculating the set of topologies before intrusion detection and applies
one of the pre-calculated topology on intrusion detection.
3.3 System Model
As shown in Figure 2 in Section 3.1, the IoT network consists of an IDS,
an SDN controller, a base station (single board computer with 2.4 GHz RF
transceiver), and IoT nodes. The base station acts as a gateway between the
SDN controller and the IoT nodes and transfers the received data by the IoT
nodes to the SDN controller. We consider the Snort IDS [33].
In this setting, the base station receives data from the IoT nodes and
sends it to the SDN controller for query (sent by the user, i.e., weather query
or noise query) processing. The IoT nodes communicate via the ZigBee
communication protocol [5]. This protocol works on low bandwidth, low
latency, and low energy consumption that is ideal for resource constraint
nodes. However, in terms of security, ZigBee protocol becomes vulnerable
for multi-hop communication and relies on network security. If the attacker
successfully exploits the node, it becomes easy to compromise the ZigBee
protocol and the attacker can reach the target.
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3.4 Attacker Model
In the attacker model, we consider that the attacker scans for the IoT nodes
in the IoT network. The attacker scans for multiple vulnerable IoT nodes
and chooses one of them as an entry point. After choosing a node, the at-
tacker tries to compromise it. In the meantime, the IDS detects the attacker’s
presence (we consider 100 percent detection accuracy of IDS) and the recon-
figuration algorithm changes the position of the attacked node. As a result,
the attacker loses the connection and try to connect with another vulnerable
IoT node. For the vulnerability analysis, we use the Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE) / National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [30] for IoT
networks. The vulnerabilities of the nodes, vulnerabilities score, MTTC for
each vulnerability and the impact are listed in Table 1. For each IoT node,
we choose a random vulnerability value from the given table. We use the
uniform random function to choose and assign the vulnerability value for
each IoT node.
We have defined a certain threshold value (0.5 as it has medium impact
and act as a border between low impact and high impact ) based on vul-
nerability score which specifies whether the IoT node has easy to exploit
vulnerability (CVSS-BS >= 0.5) or hard to exploit vulnerability (CVSS-BS
< 0.5). The calculation of the MTTC for the vulnerability is explained in
Section 3.7.3.
In our attacker model, we assume an attacker with the following assump-
tions:
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CVE-2019-2338 0.71 1.39 High
CVE-2019-2322 0.98 1.05 High
CVE-2019-2318 0.55 1.78 High
CVE-2019-10616 0.45 2.30 Low
CVE-2019-2261 0.45 2.30 Low
CVE-2019-2315 0.78 1.21 High
CVE-2019-10591 0.75 1.33 High
CVE-2019-10590 0.98 1.05 High
CVE-2019-10587 0.98 1.05 High
CVE-2018-11976 0.45 2.30 Low
CVE-2017-8329 0.46 2.11 Low
CVE-2019-11820 0.45 2.30 Low
CVE-2019-14071 0.78 1.21 High
CVE-2017-11578 0.49 2.01 Low
• The entry point to the IoT network is an IoT node.
• The attacker scans the IoT network using reconnaissance attack and
exploit the vulnerability associated with the node to compromise the
node.
• When a node is compromised, the attacker becomes part of the IoT
network.
• The attacker compromises all nodes between the entry point and the
base station.




In our defense model, we propose an algorithm to reconfigure the IoT net-
work topology on intrusion detection. Our objective is to make the attack
surface hard by offering maximum number of IoT nodes having hard to ex-
ploit vulnerabilities from the entry point of the attacker to the base station.
We implement Algorithm 1 for topology reconfiguration and use the following
notation to express the algorithm.
• si: The IoT nodes in the network (i ∈ {1....n}). where n is the total
number of IoT nodes.
• bsi : one neighbour IoT node.
• RT : The initial IoT network topology before reconfiguration.
• Rf : The IoT network topology after reconfiguration (when the intru-
sion is detected).
• vsi : A vulnerability value of si.
• Psi : The current parent node of si.
• hj: A hop count calculated between two IoT nodes in an IoT network,
e.g., entry point node to its parent node and then the parent of the
entry point node’s parent and so on.
• Hi: Total number of hops in Rf , in one path (i.e., the number of hops
in one path of the optimal topology after reconfiguration).
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• Hmax: The maximum number of hops in one path of RT , i.e., the
number of hops in one path of the initial topology.
• vbsi : Vulnerability value of neighbour (bsi) IoT node.
• N : Total number of IoT nodes with hard to exploit Vulnerabilities.
• Xi: A single IoT node with hard to exploit vulnerability.
• Ki: One attack path from entry point node up to the target. i.e., it is
a set of nodes.
• Csi : The list of elements in a communication range of Si.
• KRF : An optimal path which gives maximum number of IoT nodes
having hard to exploit vulnerabilities and minimum number of hops
after reconfiguration.
• T: Threshold value based on CVSS-BS to check the easy to exploit
vulnerability and hard to exploit vulnerability of IoT node.
• A*: To initialize variables.
The algorithm reconfigures the IoT network topology according to the
following steps:
• Compute the possible reconfigured set of topologies in the same com-
munication range of IoT nodes before intrusion detection and apply the
suitable pre-computed topology on intrusion detection.
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Algorithm 1: Topology Reconfiguration
1 for each bsi ∈ Csi do
2 KRF ← A∗;
3 Hi ← A∗;
4 N ← A∗;
5 while bsi belongs Psi ! = Φ do
6 Add bsi into Ki ;
7 if vbsi < T then
8 Add Xi into N ;
9 end
10 Add hj into Hi;
11 bsi ←bsi [psi ];
12 end
13 if Hi = Hmax then





• If the node at the entry point of the attacker have easy to exploit
vulnerability, it checks for the next neighbor IoT nodes, whether it is
easy to exploit vulnerable or hard to exploit vulnerable.
• It establishes the connection with the IoT node which have hard to
exploit vulnerability and offer the same number of hops from that IoT
node to the base station.
The explanation of algorithm is as follows.
In line 1, the algorithm checks the communication range for a node to its
neighbor nodes, and gives the list of nodes in the same communication range.
Line 2 initiates the path list that is empty at the initial stage and after that
includes the path based on the maximum number of IoT nodes with hard
to exploit vulnerabilities. Line 3 and 4 initialize the hops and number of
IoT nodes having hard to exploit vulnerabilities respectively. Line 5 is the
condition which picks the nearest neighbor IoT node with hard to exploit
vulnerability in the communication range, of the IoT node that is entry point
for the attacker. Then algorithm checks the parent IoT node of that neighbor
IoT node and check if it is in the path list of elements in the communication
range. If it is not in the path list, the loop breaks for current IoT node and
starts for the next IoT node in the path. The loop keeps checking for all the
IoT nodes until the base station (root node). Line 6 adds all the neighbor
IoT nodes of the IoT node that is under scanning attack and gives the path
list from entry point till base station. Line 7 includes the vulnerability value
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of current neighbor IoT node and compares it with the threshold value. If
the vulnerability value of the neighbor IoT node is less than the threshold
value, the IoT node is considered hard to exploit vulnerable and added it to
the hard to exploit variable in line 8. Line 10 adds each hop of the path into
the total number of hops, each time the while condition becomes true. Line
11 includes the next neighbor IoT node which the while condition checks at
line 5, to identify if it is already included in the path list or not. If it is not
in the path list then the while condition executes again up to line 11. Line
12 ends the while condition. Line 13 compares the initial topology hops with
the hops counted during reconfiguration. If the counted hops are equal or
less to the initial topology hops, we consider it as one path. This path is
added to the total number of paths offering maximun number of IoT nodes
with hard to exploit vulnerabilities, in line 14. Line 15 ends the condition
started at line 13. Line 16 returns the total number of paths. Line 17 ends
the loop, started at line 1.
3.6 Metrics
To evaluate our defense mechanism, we use the following metrics.
• Number of IoT nodes with hard to exploit vulnerabilities: Maximum
number of hard to exploit vulnerabilities of IoT nodes in the attack
path represents the optimal attack path.
• MTTC: It is the time (hour) to compromise all the IoT nodes by the
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attacker from the entry point upto the base station.
The MTTC is the time, the attacker takes to compromise all the IoT nodes in
the path, from entry point up to the base station. When the IDS detects an
intrusion, it triggers the reconfiguration of the IoT network topology. After
reconfiguration, the number of IoT nodes with hard to exploit vulnerabilities
are more along the path to the base station and the attacker takes more time
to compromise the IoT nodes. There are less chances for the attacker to
exploit all the IoT nodes and less chances to reach the base station.
3.7 Simulation
In our simulation, we consider the IoT network based on Figure 2. We
consider the following machine specifications and the IoT nodes. We use
the desktop machine with the operating system, Windows 10 64-bit, 8.0 GB
RAM, and Core i5-8250u (1.60GHz) processor. We consider the IoT nodes
are based on microcontrollers and configured with the ZigBee radio module
based on IEEE 802.15.4 standard [5]. To achieve the programmability via
the SDN controller, we consider SDN-WISE protocol [34].
3.7.1 Simulation Settings
In simulation settings, we use a SD-IoT network consisting of 100 IoT nodes.
In the network, 50 percent of the IoT nodes have easy to exploit vulnerabil-
ities and 50 percent of the IoT nodes have hard to exploit vulnerabilities, to
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investigate the performance of our implemented algorithm. We assume the
presence of an attacker in the IoT network and the attacker’s main goal is
to compromise the base station. We assume that the IoT nodes are installed
in a specific area of interest which is a smart office in our case, and send
the gathered data (weather update, noise) from the surroundings towards
the base station. We distribute the IoT nodes in a circle form and define
the simulation area that is 360 meters * 360 meters [30]. The average dis-
tance between the two IoT nodes is 25 meters and they communicate with
each other via ZigBee protocol. The ZigBee [5] protocol specifications in-
dicate the transmission range of ZigBee, which is 10 meters to 100 meters
depending on the power output of the individual device and the surrounding
environment. We use the 75 meters of average communication range in our
simulations (e.g., one node can communicate with any of the other node with
in this range).
The SDN controller defines the routing policies for the packets flow at
base station. The communication between the IoT nodes takes place via
steps explained in defense model of Section 3.5. The attacker chooses the
entry point node randomly and try to reach the base station by following the
steps as discussed in the Section 3.4. When the attacker scan for the IoT
node, the intrusion is detected by the IDS. It triggers the reconfiguration
algorithm and the connections shuffling takes place between the nodes. The
attacker loses the connection and try to exploit another node to break into the
IoT network. To evaluate our defense mechanism, we compute the MTTC
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[30] before and after reconfiguration, across each path from the entry point.
We calculate the number of IoT nodes with hard to exploit vulnerabilities
along the path in the reconfigured topology and use the HARM to compute
all the possible attack paths from entry point up to the base station. The
percentage of easy to exploit and hard to exploit vulnerabilities of IoT nodes
is equal in both topologies (e.g., before and after reconfiguration).
3.7.2 Simulation Steps
We compute the MTTC before reconfiguration and after reconfiguration of
IoT network topology. We used the reconfiguration algorithm to reconfigure
the randomly generated IoT network topology. On reconfiguration, we have
the reconfigured IoT network topology and compute all the possible paths
that attacker uses to reach the base station. We calculate the MTTC of
the paths for initial IoT network topology and reconfigured IoT network
topology.
To compute the MTTC, we consider the following steps:
• We consider the presence of an attacker in the IoT network.
• The attacker chooses the entry point randomly.
• On the detection by IDS, the SDN controller reconfigures the topology,
and the attacker loses the current connection.
• The attackers choose another entry point to break into the IoT network
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and continue to compromise the IoT nodes until they reach the base
station.
Initially, the detection takes place only once to trigger the topology reconfig-
uration. The reason to trigger the topology reconfiguration is to measure the
MTTC for the path with the maximum number of hard to exploit vulnerable
IoT nodes. Because, we get the topology with the maximum number of hard
to exploit vulnerable IoT nodes after reconfiguration.
3.7.3 Simulation Results and Analysis
We use the example IoT network as shown in Figure 2 for our simulation.
We perform the following steps in our simulation.
• We generate the IoT network 10 times with an equal proportion of easy
to exploit and hard to exploit vulnerable IoT nodes.
• We increase the size of the IoT network by 10 IoT nodes each time.
• We randomly assign the vulnerabilities to the IoT nodes.
• We run the simulation 100 times for each time the IoT network gener-
ated.
• We regenerate a new IoT network topology for each run for a given
size.
• The attacker randomly select the entry point IoT node, each time the
IoT network is regenerated.
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We use the reconfiguration algorithm as explained in Section 3.5, to re-
configure the IoT network topology. It gives all possible paths from the
entry point to the base station with the maximum number of IoT nodes hav-
ing hard to exploit vulnerabilities. We compute the MTTC before and after
reconfiguration of IoT network in each step.
We calculate the MTTC in hours of IoT network from a node, path, and
network-level as follows:
We consider MTTCsn as the mean time to compromise for node level. For
example, we calculate the MTTC for 87th node. We calculate the MTTCs87





We consider ap as attack path captured in HARM. We consider that there
is only one attack path for initial IoT network in HARM. We calculate the








To explain the MTTC calculation we consider one attack path for initial
network. The Equation 3 gives the MTTC value as follows:
MTTCnet = MTTCini = 13.79 hours (3)
We plot the results for increasing number of IoT nodes and the MTTC
value in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Mean Values of Metric
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3.8 Results Discussion
The graph represents the MTTC values against the number of IoT nodes.
As explained above, we compute the MTTC before and after IoT network
topology reconfiguration. The MTTC increases or decreases based on the
attackers entry point node location in the IoT network (as they choose entry
point randomly each time the network regenerated) and length of the path
from the entry point to the base station. Besides, If the entry point is the
last node (100th) in the IoT network, the path is considered as the longest
path.
We compare the MTTC values between two scenarios namely before and
after topology reconfiguration. In Figure 3, the MTTC value for the scenario
of 10 and 30 number of IoT nodes is the same. The reason could be easy to
exploit vulnerabilities attached to the IoT nodes and the attack path length.
The attack path length could be shorter, after reconfiguration, because the
node that was under scanning attack by the attacker, became the child of
the node close to the base station.
On the contrary, the MTTC value for the scenario, after topology recon-
figuration, has explainable difference in 40 and 100 number of IoT nodes.
It is double than the before topology reconfiguration, for 40 number of IoT
nodes network and four times for the 100 number of IoT nodes network.
Figure 3 depicts that the MTTC is almost higher in after topology reconfig-
uration scenario except for 20 nodes scenario. We conclude from the results
that the attacker put more efforts to reach the base station upon topology
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reconfiguration.
Advantages of Reconfiguration: In the reconfigured IoT network,
the MTTC increases with the increasing number of IoT nodes having hard
to exploit vulnerabilities as the algorithm brings the maximum number of IoT
nodes having hard to exploit vulnerabilities in the path. The graph shows
the attacker needs more effort to compromise hard to exploit vulnerable IoT
nodes in that path. Eventually, the attacker has less gain in the reconfigured
IoT network topology.
3.9 Conclusion and Future Work
We consider the reactive defense mechanism for SD-IoT network with easy
to exploit and hard to exploit vulnerabilities of IoT nodes. We consider the
smart office environment for our SD-IoT network. We evaluate our defense
mechanism via simulations. We calculated the MTTC for two IoT network
topology scenarios. The scenarios are before topology reconfiguration and
after topology reconfiguration. We compare the MTTC values for both sce-
narios and plot results in the graph.
The proposed defense mechanism works under the assumption of 100
percent detection accuracy of IDS. Besides, our defense mechanism works
when one IoT node is under scanning attack. In our future work, we will
consider the actual detection accuracy of IDS based on real world scenario.
Besides, we will consider the case when attacker scan for mare than one IoT
nodes at a time and use them as an entry point.
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Chapter 4
4 Proactive Defense Mechanism
The proactive defense mechanism is an integrated defense mechanism that
combines the deception with MTD and shuffles the IoT network topology
proactively. It shuffles the IoT network topology every time the defined
security failure conditions (fixed or random time threshold) become true. The
proposed defense mechanism uses the deception technology. It is a proactive
technique and captures the malicious behavior of the attacker by luring the
attacker towards the decoy system [35]. The decoy system includes fake
IoT nodes while the attacker does not know whether the IoT nodes are real
or fake. Once the attacker interact with the fake IoT node, the melicious
behavior of the attacker is recorded.
The proposed defense mechanism also uses the MTD. The MTD tech-
niques shuffle the connection between the IoT nodes when the defined se-
curity failure conditions as explained in Section 4.3, become true. In our
proposed defense mechanism, we consider the fix shuffling (FS) and random
shuffling (RS) MTD techniques for three different network scenarios. The
network scenarios are as follows.
• Network with MTD only
• Network with real nodes and decoy nodes only
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• Network with Decoy Nodes and MTD
Our key contribution to the proposed integrated proactive defense mech-
anism is as follows.
• We consider the FS-strategy for the three aforementioned network sce-
narios and compare the results.
• We consider the RS-strategy for these three network scenarios and com-
pare the results.
• We use two new metrics that are APV and APE, to measure the effec-
tiveness of our proposed defense mechanism.
The APV and APE metrics measure the effectiveness of the proposed
defense mechanism in terms of a shift in the attack surface. These metrics
offer new attack paths at a defined time interval to make the attack sur-
face harden. In addition to the APV and APE metrics, we also measured
the mean-time-to-security-failure (MTTSF) metric and Defense Cost (DC)
metric proposed by [36].
4.1 Scenario Description
We propose a proactive integrated defense mechanism. The main goal of our
defense mechanism is to secure the SD-IoT network using a decoy system as
cyber-deception and topology reconfiguration as an MTD technique.
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Figure 4: SD-IoT Network [36]
To evaluate our integrated defense mechanism, we use HARM which gives
the design solution by considering the attack graphs and then calculates the
security level for all attack paths. We use the example SD-IoT network as
shown in Figure 4 proposed by [36], for our proactive defense mechanism.
The SD-IoT network consists of an SDN controller, SDN switches, servers,
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and IoT nodes. The IoT nodes and the servers are placed in different VLANs,
based on the different functionalities. The IoT nodes are a mix of real nodes
and decoy nodes. We consider the SDN programmability to manage and
control the communication between IoT nodes.
4.2 Methodology
Our methodology consists of a network model, attack model, and defense
model. The network model describes the SD-IoT network, the attack model
explains the assumptions we make for the attacker attached with the IoT
network and the defense model explains the defense strategies.
4.2.1 Network Model
Our network model is an SD-IoT network in a smart hospital environment.
The IoT network consists of different IoT nodes and are used for different
purposes. The IoT nodes are namely, MRI, CT Scan, Smart Thermostat,
Smart Meter, Smart Camera, Smart TV, Laptop, and a server [37]. These
IoT nodes are placed in different VLANs as shown in Figure 4. The SDN
controller manages and controls the IoT nodes via SDN switches and IoT
nodes send the collected data to the server for further query processing. In
our SD-IoT network, we consider some of the nodes are compromised and
some of the nodes have critical information. We also deploy decoy nodes
in each VLAN of the IoT network. Finally, we specify the vulnerabilities
attached to the IoT nodes.
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4.2.2 Attack Model
We consider the assumptions for an attacker attached to the SD-IoT network
and assign the privileges to the attacker as follows.
• We assume that the attacker has less knowledge about the IoT node
whether it is a real node or decoy node. The attacker’s knowledge
depends on how much they get information about the IoT network, on
interaction with the IoT network.
• On attacker’s interaction with the decoy, the intentions of the attacker
are recorded. However, if the attacker knows that the node with which
they are interacting is a decoy node, the attacker terminates the inter-
action and find another node to break into the system.
• We assume that the main target of the attacker is to leak confidential
information to an unauthorized party outside the SD-IoT network.
• We also consider that the attacker can identify the unpatchable vul-
nerabilities and can compromise these vulnerabilities to break into the
SD-IoT network.
• The attacker can only compromise vulnerable IoT nodes and then can
reach the server, which is the main target.
The vulnerabilities attached to the IoT nodes are collected from Common
CVE/NVD [38]. In our assumptions, we consider that there is one exploitable
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vulnerability attached to each IoT node and attackers exploit this vulnera-
bility to break into the system. We also consider the compromise rate for
the vulnerabilities shown in Table 2. It shows the attacker’s frequency to
exploit the vulnerability successfully and to gain the root privilege per unit
time (hour). The compromise rate value is an estimation based on the score
from the CVSS [38]. We calculate the compromise rate value depends on the
base score as follows.
• If the base score is 10.0, we estimate the compromise rate once per day
(i.e., 0.042).
• If the base score is 8.0, we estimate the compromise rate twice per week
(i.e., 0.012).
• If the base score is around 7.0, we estimate the compromise rate once
per week (i.e., 0.006).
• If the base score is around 5.0, we estimate the compromise rate once
per 10 days (i.e., 0.004)
Table 2 shows the real node vulnerabilities, their detail, and the com-
promise rate. Similarly, Table 3 shows the decoy node vulnerabilities, their
detail, and the compromise rate.
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Table 2: Real Node and Vulnerability Information
Real Node VLAN CVE ID Compromise Rate
MRI VLAN1 CVE-2018-8308 0.006
CT Scan VLAN1 CVE-2018-8308 0.006
Smart Thermostat VLAN2 CVE-2018-11315 0.006
Smart Meter VLAN2 CVE-2017-9944 0.042
Smart Camera VLAN2 CVE-2018-10660 0.042
Smart TV VLAN3 CVE-2018-4094 0.012
Laptop VLAN3 CVE-2018-8345 0.004
Server VLAN4 CVE-2018-8273 0.006
Table 3: Decoy Node and Vulnerability Information
Decoy Node VLAN CVE ID Compromise Rate
CT Scan VLAN1 CVE-2018-8136 0.012
Smart Camera VLAN2 CVE-2018-6294 0.042
Smart TV VLAN3 CVE-2018-4095 0.012
Server VLAN4 CVE-2018-1930 0.042
4.2.3 Defense Model
We assume that the SD-IoT network has its traditional defense mechanisms
which consist of Network based-IDS, anti-virus software on server. However,
we add the intrusion prevention mechanism on top of the traditional defense
mechanisms and integrate the cyberdeception with MTD.
The cyberdeception technique attracts the attacker by offering exploitable
vulnerabilities. The attacker takes the advantage of exploitable vulnerabil-
ity and interact with it to break into the IoT network. Once the attacker
interacts with the IoT nodes, the decoy system monitors the behavior of the
attacker and reveals the intentions of the attacker to the defender. The IoT
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nodes of the decoy system are mimic of real IoT nodes and it is difficult for
the attacker to identify whether the IoT node is real or decoy.
We use network topology shuffling as an MTD defense mechanism (NTS-
MTD). NTS-MTD triggers when the intrusion event is detected in the SD-
IoT network. The SDN controller manages and changes the connections
between the IoT nodes on topology reconfiguration. Each VLAN has a de-
coy IoT node and the connection changes take place from real IoT node to
decoy IoT node, decoy IoT nodes to decoy IoT node and decoy IoT node to
decoy server. After reconfiguration, the resulted network topology consists
of randomly distributed real and decoy nodes as the connections are changed
and makes the attack surface complex for the attacker.
4.3 Security Failure Conditions
We consider that the attacker can enter into the IoT network by performing
the reconnaissance attack. The reconnaissance attack causes the failure of
the IoT network integrity and allows the outside attacker to penetrate the
network using different scanning techniques. Once the attacker identify the
vulnerable IoT node in the IoT network, he/she try to compromise that
node and break into the IoT network. Now the attacker can perform the
data exfiltration attack. This attack causes the loss of confidentiality of the
IoT network. Now the attacker can use different credentials to compromise
the nodes with confidential information.
Based on these two attacks, we define two security failure conditions.
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We consider our IoT network compromised if either of the security failure
condition becomes true.
Security Failure Condition 1 (SFC1): SFC1 occurs because of the
loss of integrity. It uses the concept of Byzantine Failure [39], that is one-
third of the nodes in the network, are compromised.
Security Failure Condition 2 (SFC2): SFC2 occurs because of the
loss of confidentiality. The confidential information (e.g., login details, pass-
words etc) is leaked to outside unauthorized entities by the attacker who
compromise the IoT nodes.
4.4 Metrics
To measure the security and performance of our proposed defense mechanism,
we use the following metrics.
• Attack Path Variation (APV): It measures the change in attack
paths upon SD-IoT network topology reconfiguration.
• Attack Path Exposure (APE): This metric measures the time du-
ration (the time a path is staying unchanged in the network) of attack
paths appeared in one state of network.
• Mean Time to Security Failure (MTTSF): This metric measures
the network lifetime indicating how long the network prolongs until the
network reaches the security failure.
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• Defense Cost (DC): It gives the cost associated with shuffling oper-
ations. we count the number of edges shuffled (i.e., from connected to
disconnected and from disconnected to connected).
4.4.1 Calculation of Metrics
APV: The APV measures the shift in the attack path upon reconfiguration
of IoT network topology. As a result, the new attack paths appear and
increase the attack effort. It is because, when the attack path is changed,
the attacker loses the gathered information about the intended attack path
and start to redesign the attack strategy.
To calculate the APV, we consider the attack paths difference, ∆APAPi,APi−1
before and after reconfiguration (between two network states, i and i-1).
Here, the APi gives the set of attack paths in i
th state of the network. The
variation in the current set of attack paths is the difference from the previous
set of attack paths (Set Subtraction). For example in network state 1 , we
have the set of attack paths as {a → b → c, a → d → c, a → e → c}. In-
network state 2, we apply MTD mechanism and get the set of attack paths
as {a→ b→ c, a→ f → c}.
Here “d” changed to “f” that represents a new attack path and the attack
path {a→ e→ c} does not appear upon reconfiguration.
Let “ - ” define as to subtract the two set. Now the difference in the set
of attack paths is as shown in Equation 4.
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{a→ b→ c, a→ f → c} − {a→ b→ c, a→ d→ c, a→ e→ c} = {a→ f → c}
(4)
The set of difference from the previous network state to the current one
reveals the number of new attack paths which were not in the previous net-
work state. In the above example, it is {a→ f → c}.
To reveal the attack paths difference for i number of network states, we





Where |APi − APi−1| is the cardinal value which represents the count of
difference in attack paths between two states.
To compute the APV metric for all the network states “S” on reconfigu-







Here, |S| is cardinal value that is the attack paths in one state.
The above equation represents the overall changes in the attack paths
and their variations in all the observed network states “S”.
We develop Algorithm 2 to calculate the APV. We use the following
general notations to explain the algorithm.
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• bi: The IoT nodes in the network (i ∈ {1,....,n}). Where n is the number
of IoT nodes.
• hi: Single attack path in a list of attack paths (i ∈ {1,....,x}). Where
x is the number of attack paths.
• ni−1: Previous network state.
• mi: Current network state.
• K: List of new attack paths.
• C : A list of all the attack paths in the network.
• Q: The attack paths in current network state.
• R: The attack paths in previous network state.
• P: Set of attack paths appeared, after reconfiguration.
• L: Adding the time duration (attack path appearance time)randomly
for each attack path.
• U: Total time duration of the attack path appeared in one network
state.
• A*: To initialize variables.
• “ / ”: Operator for division.
• “ - ”: To subtract the values.
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• “ * ”: To multiply the two values.
Algorithm 2: Attack Path Variation (APV)
Result: Attack path variation solution
1 for each attack path ∈ m and n do
2 ni−1 = R;
3 mi = Q;
4 ap← C;
5 for bi ∈ mi do
6 if bi is not in ni−1 then
7 Add bi into mi
8 end
9 K = P/mi;
10 Add K into Result ;
11 end
12 end
13 Return (Result/C -1)
The explanation of the Algorithm 2 is as follows.
In the algorithm we go through all the attack paths in the current network
state and the previous network state (line 1). We get the attack paths in the
previous network state and current network state (line 2,3). We initialize the
attack path list (line 4). We go through each node bi in the current network
state (line 5), we check if any of the node which was not in the previous
network state (line 6). We add that node into current network state (line
7). The addition of new node represents the appearance of new attack path
and we get the list of new attack paths appeared in the current state (line
9). We add these new attack paths into the attack path variation solution
in line 10. Finally, we recover the attack path variation solution by dividing
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the result with the total number of attack paths in the network.
APE: This metric gives the time duration of APE for attacker [40]. The
attack can be launched successfully if the attack path exposure time is long
and it is desired to keep it minimum. We use the following equation to
calculate the APE.
APV = 1− Σ
|S|
i=ot(apj)
|AP | ∗ σ|s|i=1t(si)
(7)
where t(si) represents the time duration (in hour) of i
th network state,
t(apj) represents the time duration of an attack, exploiting the attack path
apj (single attack path) and AP represents the set of attack paths. Where
apj is the attack path out of the set of attack paths in APi ( ∀apj ∈ APi).
If the initial attack paths are exposed to all the network states without
any new attack paths, then the APE value tends toward zero. The ideal
condition is that the attack path appears in the new network state, upon
reconfiguration, may not appear in the initial network state. It means the
exposure duration of that specific attack path is minimum.
We develop Algorithm 3 to calculate the APE and use the general nota-
tions, given above, to explain the algorithm. The explanation of the Algo-
rithm 3 is as follows.
We initializ the attack path exposure solution, total time duration of an
attack path in one network state and the list of new attack paths (line 1-4)
respectively. We go through all the attack paths in the attack path list (line
5). We get the attack paths in the current network state mi at line 6. We
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add the time to all the attack paths in the current state of network (line 7).
We go through all the attack paths again and check for each attack path if
it is not in the new attack path list K (line 8,9) and add that attack path to
the new attack path list (line 10). We add the new attack path duration time
into total time and return the attack path exposure solution (line 12-15).
Algorithm 3: Attack Path Exposure (APE)
Result: Attack path exposure solution
1 Initialization;
2 L← A∗;
3 U ← A∗;
4 K ← A∗;
5 for each attack path ∈ K do
6 mi = Q;
7 Add mi * K into L;
8 for hi ∈ mi do
9 if hi is not in K then
10 Add hi into K;
11 end
12 Add L into U;
13 end
14 end
15 Return 1 - (L / K * U)
4.5 Simulation
We run the simulations 100 times for each of the network scenario. In sim-
ulation, we explain the simulation settings, schemes used for the shuffling
of topology, and performance analysis. We use the desktop machine with
the operating system, Windows 10 64-bit, 8.0 GB RAM, and Core i5-8250u
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(1.60GHz) processor. We implement our proposed defense mechanism based
on the workflow as shown in Figure 5
Figure 5: Workflow of Defense Mechanisms
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4.5.1 Simulation Setting
We consider the smart hospital environment equipped with IoT nodes in our
simulation setting as shown in Figure 4. The IoT nodes are deployed in
different VLANs. Our IoT network consists of four VLANs.
In VLAN1, we deploy an MRI and CT Scan and consider as a medical
examination room. In VLAN2, we deploy a smart thermostat, smart meter,
and a smart camera, and consider as a medical care unit. In VLAN3, we
deploy smart TV and a laptop and consider it as a staff office. We consider
the VLAN4 as a server room.
During the initial deployment, the VLAN4 is connected with all the three
VLANs. It is because the IoT nodes in the other three VLANs send the gath-
ered information to the server placed in VLAN4, for further query processing.
The VLAN3 is a staff room and it is connected with VLAN2, to receive the
medical data and videos from the smart camera and to monitor and control
the sensors. All the IoT nodes have vulnerabilities and attacker can exploit
these vulnerabilities to compromise the IoT nodes. The vulnerabilities for
the real nodes are given in Table 2.
For cyberdeception, we deploy decoy nodes on VLANs, and in our network
scenario, we deploy one decoy node in each VLAN. There are two types of
decoy nodes we use in VLANs.
• Emulated decoy node: It is a fake asset node that is used to deceive
the attacker. The fake nodes are the mimic of the original nodes with
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the same functionality as the real nodes.
• Full-Operating System (OS) decoy node: The full operating sys-
tem decoy nodes are the replication of the real operating system and
software on the production devices such as server..
We consider a Full-OS-based server as a decoy and emulated based decoy
nodes which are CT Scan, Smart TV, and Smart camera. The decoy nodes
are also attached to the vulnerabilities and attackers exploit these vulnera-
bilities to gain the root access of the decoy nodes. The vulnerabilities of the
decoy nodes are given in Table 3.
4.5.2 Network Scenarios to Calculate Metrics
To calculate the metrics for performance analysis, we consider three network
scenarios. We name these scenarios as ”How-to-shuffle” network topology.
Scenario with MTD Only: In this scenario, we consider the SD-IoT
network without decoy nodes and we only consider the MTD technique to
shuffle the network topology. This scenario uses a random shuffling algo-
rithm. We calculate the proposed metrics for fixed time interval topology
shuffling and random time interval topology shuffling.
Scenario with Decoy Nodes Only: In this scenario, we consider the
SD-IoT network with real nodes and decoy nodes. we randomly add the
connections between real nodes, from real nodes to decoy nodes and decoy
nodes to decoy nodes. We do not add the connections from decoy nodes
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to real nodes. The flow is one way. The decoy nodes always communicate
with decoy nodes, and the attacker can not moves to real nodes if they are
interacting with decoy nodes. Finally, We apply fixed time interval topol-
ogy shuffling and random time interval topology shuffling to reconfigure the
topology and to calculate the metrics for evaluation.
Scenario With Decoy Nodes and MTD: For this scenario, we con-
sider a network with decoy nodes along with the MTD technique. We use
the heuristic shuffling algorithm [36] and shuffle the connections between real
nodes to decoy nodes to give the maximum number of decoy attack paths
in the SD-IoT network. The algorithm selects the optimal network topology
which offers the maximum number of decoy attack paths to the attacker.
Finally, we calculate the metrics for a fixed time interval and random time
interval techniques.
4.5.3 Six schemes to compare the metric results based on when-
to-shuffle and how-to-shuffle strategies
We consider two when-to-shuffle network topology strategies as follows.
FS: This strategy shuffles the network topology at fix time interval.
RS: This strategy shuffles the network topology at a random time inter-
val. The random time interval is achieved by following the variation in fix
strategy. The fix strategy is the distribution with the mean being the same
as the fixed time interval. This will add some stochastic nature to the time
interval which is treated as a random variable.
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Table 4: Keywords, their meanings and default values.
Keyword Meaning Value
SFC1 Loss of system integrity 0.5
SFC2 Loss of system confidentiality 0.5
Prob. Probability of change in connection between nodes in RS 0.5
Time FS time interval used (hour) 24
Path time Attack path exposure time in each network state (hour) 1-5
Mean time Mean time used for exponential distribution in RS (hour) 24
By combining when-to-shuffle strategies with “how-to-shuffle” network
topology, we get six schemes as FS-MTD, FS-Decoy, FS-Decoy-MTD, RS-
MTD, RS-Decoy, and RS-Decoy-MTD. We perform the metric values com-
parative analysis for these six schemes and conclude which scheme outper-
forms.
Table 4 presents the keywords, their meaning and default value which we
use in our simulation.
4.5.4 Comparative Analysis
We carried out the performance analysis by comparing the six schemes as
mentioned above. We use the Fix shuffling and random shuffling strategies
for each scenario to calculate the APV, APE, MTTSF, and DC.
Figure 6 gives the performance analysis comparison for 6 schemes.
• Figure 6a compares the APV for three network scenarios. The higher
APV value represents an effective solution. It means the attack path
that appeared in one state does not appear in the second state of the
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Figure 6: Shuffling Strategies Comparisons
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network. In the “when-to-shuffle” strategy, the FS performs better than
the RS strategy. In the “how-to-shuffle” strategy, the only decoy based
network scenario scheme performs comparatively better than the other
two. Overall, the “MTD & Decoy Network Scenario” has less value
than the MTD only and Decoy only network scenario. It is because
the topology change takes place less number of times in “MTD and
Decoy network scenario” than the “MTD only network scenario” and
“Decoy only network scenario”. If the topology change takes place
more number of times, the more new attack paths appear and APV
value becomes high.
• Figure 6b compares the APE for “how-to-shuffle” network topology
scenarios. The lower APE value represents the effective solution. It
means the attack path appearance duration is minimum and the attack
path variation is high. The high attack path variation shows that the
attack path stays for less time and replaced by new attack path. In
the “when-to-shuffle” strategy, the FS strategy performs better. For
the “how-to-shuffle” network topology scenario, the MTD & Decoy-
based network scenario for fixed time intervals performs better. The
reason behind this is the topology reconfiguration takes place in a fix
time interval for FS MTD & Decoy-based network scenario, even if
the intrusion is not detected. At the fix time interval the topology
reconfigures and new attack paths appear that represent the high attack
path variation and low APE value. In addition, the MTD & Decoy
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based network scenario gives more new connections from real node to
decoy nodes and gives more attack paths on reconfiguration. It results
the less APE value.
• Figure 6c compares the average MTTSF for three network scenarios.
The higher value of MTTSF represents the effective solution which
means the attacker takes more time to compromise the network. In the
“when-to-shuffle” strategy, the RS performs better than the FS. On the
other hand, in the “how-to-shuffle” strategy, the MTTSF is higher for
decoy based network scenario. It means the attacker gets the higher
deception level and follows the path leads to the decoy server.
Overall, the RS strategy performs better than the FS strategy to cal-
culate the MTTSF.
The RS strategy reconfigures the topology at a random time interval.
In result, it reconfigures the topology more often than FS strategy
and attacker loses the information upon reconfiguration and try to find
another entry point to launch the attack.
• Figure 6d compares the average DC for three network scenarios. The
lower value of DC means an effective solution. The DC is associated
with the number of connections change, each time the network shuffling
takes place. In the “when-to-shuffle” strategy, the FS strategy performs
slightly better than the RS strategy. On the other hand, the DC for
the decoy and MTD network scenario is lower and it outperforms than
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other network scenarios.
In the MTD only network scenario and Decoy only network scenario,
the security failure conditions might be achieved earlier than the Decoy
and MTD network scenario. When the threshold is achieved, topology
reconfiguration and connection changes between the nodes take place.
The new attack paths appear upon connection changes. The number of
attack paths are inversely proportional to the DC. It leads to a higher
value of DC in MTD only network scenario and Decoy only network
scenario while lower value of DC in Decoy and MTD network scenario.
4.6 Results Discussion and Conclusion
From the results, we can see that the deployment of decoy nodes in the
IoT network affects the attacker’s abilities to compromise the IoT nodes.
However, it gives higher defense costs among the other network scenarios.
There is no single scheme that achieves all the goals of maximizing APV
(Figure 6a), MTTSF (Figure 6c), and minimizing the APE (Figure 6b), DC
(Figure 6d). The graphs represent that the decoy network scenario is the best
“how-to-shuffle” strategy for APV and MTTSF while the decoy and MTD
scenario is best for APE and DC. In conclusion, if we do not consider the
DC factor, then a network scenario with decoy nodes is the optimal solution




The thesis addresses all the research questions we proposed in Chapter 1
by developing the reactive defense mechanism for the SD-IoT network and
developing the integrated proactive defense mechanism for the SD-IoT net-
work.
To address the research question Q1 in Section 1.2, We have proposed an
integrated proactive defense mechanism for the SD-IoT network. We used
deception technology with MTD as a defense strategy. We considered the
smart hospital environment as an SD-IoT network. We used VLANs in the
IoT network and deployed the IoT nodes in different VLANs according to
their functionality. Besides, each VLAN also has a decoy node in it. To
evaluate our defense mechanism, we measure the security metrics that are
APV, APE, MTTSF, and DC.
To address the research question Q2 in Section 1.2, we have proposed
the reactive defense mechanism for SD-IoT network. We consider the easy
to exploit and hard to exploit vulnerabilities attached with nodes in SD-
IoT network. We considered the smart environment as an IoT network and
performed simulations. We designed and implemented the reconfiguration
algorithm, and used varying percentage proportions of easy to exploit and
hard to exploit IoT nodes in our simulation. We measure the MTTC as a
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security metric to present the effectiveness of our defense mechanism.
5.1 Limitations and Future Work
In the reactive defense mechanism, we assume it works under the assumption
of hundred percent detection accuracy of IDS. Besides, our defense mecha-
nism works when one IoT node is under attack. The limitations can be
investigated in future research such as the attacker can scan for more than
one IoT nodes at a time and use them as an entry point.
In the proactive defense mechanism, we consider the small scale smart
hospital environment. Besides, we also assume that the attacker is not aware
of the decoy system in the SD-IoT network. In our future work, we will
develop a large-scale SD-IoT network with distributed MTD techniques. For
the decoy system, we will introduce the attacker’s intelligence about the SD-
IoT network. We will define the levels of attacker’s intelligence and will
measure the harm caused by the attacker at different intelligence levels.
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